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ABSTRACT 
Human culture is uniquely cumulative and open-ended. 
Using a computational model of cultural evolution in which 
neural network based agents evolve ideas for actions 
through invention and imitation, we tested the hypothesis 
that this is due to the capacity for recursive recall. We 
compared runs in which agents were limited to single-step 
actions to runs in which they used recursive recall to chain 
simple actions into complex ones. Chaining resulted in 
higher cultural diversity, open-ended generation of novelty, 
and no ceiling on the mean fitness of actions. Both chaining 
and no-chaining runs exhibited convergence on optimal 
actions, but without chaining this set was static while with 
chaining it was ever-changing. Chaining increased the 
ability to capitalize on the capacity for learning. These 
findings show that the recursive recall hypothesis provides 
a computationally plausible explanation of why humans 
alone have evolved the cultural means to transform this 
planet. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How did humans come to be so creative? No other species 
has transformed this planet to anything near the degree that 
our species has. We now have the technology at our 
disposal to design computer models that enable us to 
investigate how our remarkable creativity came about. 
Humans are not only creative; we put our own spin on the 
inventions of others, such that new inventions build 
cumulatively on previous ones. This cumulative cultural 
change is referred to as the ratchet effect (Tomasello, 
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993), and it has been suggested that it is 
uniquely human (Donald, 1998). 
This paper uses an agent-based simulation to address the 
question of what enabled humans to be creative enough that 
cumulative, open-ended cultural evolution could take hold 
and flourish. Our approach is motivated by the view that 
there is a distinct difference between (1) culture as a system 
involving transmission of chance innovations, which is 
observed in several species, and (2) culture as a process 
involving the accumulation and differentiation of strategic 
innovations, which is unique to our species. Only (2) 
constitutes a genuine evolutionary process, for to achieve 
descent with adaptive modification it is necessary that 
change be cumulative. 
A POSSIBLE MECHANISM FOR THE ORIGIN OF 
CULTURAL EVOLUTION 
The minds of our earliest ancestors, Homo habilis, have 
been referred to as episodic because there is no evidence 
that their experience deviated from the present moment of 
concrete sensory perceptions (Donald, 1991). They were 
able to encode perceptions of events in memory, and recall 
them in the presence of a reminder or cue, but had little 
voluntary access to memories without environmental cues. 
They were therefore unable to voluntarily shape, modify, or 
practice skills and actions, and unable to invent or refine 
complex gestures or means of communicating. 
Homo erectus lived between approximately 1.8 and 0.3 
million years ago. The size of the Homo erectus brain was 
approximately 1,000 cc, about 25% larger than that of 
Homo habilis, at least twice as large as the brains of living 
great apes, and 75% the cranial capacity of modern humans 
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(Aiello, 1996; Ruff et al., 1997). This period is widely 
referred to as the beginnings of cumulative culture. Homo 
erectus exhibited many indications of enhanced 
intelligence, creativity, and ability to adapt to their 
environment, including sophisticated, task-specific stone 
handaxes, complex stable seasonal home bases, and long-
distance hunting strategies involving large game, and 
migration out of Africa. 
This period marks the onset of the archaeological record 
and it is thought to be the beginnings of human culture. It is 
widely believed that this cultural transition reflects an 
underlying transition in cognitive or social abilities. Some 
have suggested that they owe their achievements to onset of 
theory of mind (Mithen, 1998) or the capacity to imitate 
(Dugatkin, 2001). However, there is evidence that other 
species possess theory of mind and the capacity to imitate 
(Heyes, 1998), yet do not compare to modern humans in 
intelligence and cultural complexity. 
Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that the 
intelligence and cultural complexity of the Homo line can 
be attributed to the onset of massive modularity (Buss, 
1999, 2004; Barkow, Cosmides, &Tooby, 1992). However, 
although the mind exhibits an intermediate degree of 
functional and anatomical modularity, neuroscience has not 
revealed vast numbers of hardwired, encapsulated, task-
specific modules; indeed, the brain has been shown to be 
more highly subject to environmental influence than was 
previously believed (Buller, 2005; Byrne, 2000; Wexler, 
2006). 
Donald (1991) proposed that with the enlarged cranial 
capacity of Homo erectus, the human mind underwent the 
first of three transitions by which it—along with the 
cultural matrix in which it is embedded—evolved from the 
ancestral, pre-human condition. This transition is 
characterized by a shift from an episodic to a mimetic mode 
of cognitive functioning, made possible by onset of the 
capacity for voluntary retrieval of stored memories, 
independent of environmental cues. Donald refers to this as 
a self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop. Self-triggered 
recall enabled information to be processed recursively, and 
reprocessed with respect to different contexts or 
perspectives. Self-triggered recall allowed our ancestor to 
access memories voluntarily and thereby act out1 events 
that occurred in the past or that might occur in the future. 
Thus not only could the mimetic mind temporarily escape 
the here and now, but by miming or gesture, it could 
communicate similar escapes in other minds. The capacity 
to mime thus ushered forth what is referred to as a mimetic 
form of cognition and brought about a transition to the 
mimetic stage of human culture. The self-triggered recall 
and rehearsal loop also enabled our ancestors to engage in a 
stream of thought. One thought or idea evokes another, 
revised version of it, which evokes yet another, and so forth 
                                                
1 The term mimetic is derived from “mime,” which means 
“to act out.” 
recursively. In this way, attention is directed away from the 
external world toward one’s internal model of it. Finally, 
self-triggered recall allowed for voluntary rehearsal and 
refinement of actions, enabling systematic evaluation and 
improvement of skills and motor acts. 
The recursive recall hypothesis is difficult to test directly, 
for if correct it would leave no detectable trace. It is, 
however, possible to computationally model how the onset 
of the capacity for recursive recall would affect the 
effectiveness, diversity, and open-endedness of ideas 
generated in an artificial society. 
THE MODEL 
We tested Donald’s hypothesis using an agent-based 
computational model of culture referred to as ‘EVOlution 
of Culture’, abbreviated EVOC (Gabora, 2008b, 2008c; 
Gabora & Leijnen, 2009; Leijnen & Gabora, 2009). EVOC 
has been used to address such questions as (1) how does the 
presence of leaders or barriers to the diffusion of ideas 
affect cultural evolution dynamics, (2) what is the effect of 
the ratio of creators to imitators in a society, and (3) what is 
the impact of locally clustering the creators. It is an 
elaboration of Meme and Variations, or MAV (Gabora, 
1994, 1995), the earliest computer program to model 
culture as an evolutionary process in its own right (as 
opposed to modeling the interplay of cultural and biological 
evolution).The approach was inspired by Holland’s (1975) 
genetic algorithm, or GA. The GA is a search technique 
that finds solutions to complex problems by generating a 
‘population’ of candidate solutions through processes akin 
to mutation and recombination, selecting the best, and 
repeating until a satisfactory solution is found. The goal 
here was to distil the underlying logic of not biological 
evolution but cultural evolution, i.e. the process by which 
ideas adapt and build on one another in the minds of 
interacting individuals. In cultural evolution, the generation 
of novelty takes place through invention instead of through 
mutation and recombination as in biological evolution, and 
the differential replication of novelty takes place through 
imitation, instead of through reproduction with inheritance 
as in biological evolution (Gabora, 1996). EVOC (as did 
MAV) uses neural network based agents that could (1) 
invent new ideas by modifying previously learned ones, (2) 
evaluate ideas, (3) implement ideas as actions, and (4) 
imitate ideas implemented by neighbors. Agents do not 
evolve in a biological sense—they neither die nor have 
offspring—but do in a cultural sense, by generating and 
sharing ideas for actions. EVOC (like MAV) successfully 
models how ‘descent with modification’ occurs in a 
cultural context. The approach can thus be contrasted with 
computer models of how individual learning affects 
biological evolution (Best, 1999, 2006; Higgs, 2000; 
Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Hutchins & Hazelhurst, 1991).  
EVOC consists of an artificial society of neural network 
based agents in a two-dimensional grid-cell world. It is 
written in Joone, an object oriented programming 
environment, using an open source neural network library 
 3 
written in Java. We now summarize the key components of 
the agents and the world they inhabit. 
THE AGENTS 
Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes 
ideas for actions and detects trends in what constitutes a fit 
action, and (2) a body, which implements actions. The core 
of an agent is an auto associative neural network, as shown 
in Figure 1. The network learns ideas for actions. An idea is 
a pattern consisting of six elements that dictate the 
placement of the six body parts. Learning and training of 
the neural network is as per Gabora (1995).  
 
 
Figure 1. The core of an agent is an autoassociative neural 
network composed of six input nodes and six corresponding 
output nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT 
ARM, RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and 
HIPS), and seven hidden nodes that represent more abstract 
concepts (LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY, 
MOVEMENT and OPPOSITE). Input nodes and output 
nodes are connected to hidden nodes of which they are 
instances (e.g. RIGHT ARM is connected to RIGHT.) 
Activation of any input node activates the MOVEMENT 
hidden node. Same-direction activation of symmetrical input 
nodes (e.g. positive activation—which represents upward 
motion—of both arms) activates the SYMMETRY node. 
Sequential opposite movement of an ARM activates the 
OPPOSITE node. This hidden node was newly added to this 
version of the program to implement the chaining of actions to 
form multi-step actions. The hidden nodes are used to bias 
invention using learned trends about what constitutes a fit 
action. 
 
In EVOC, the neural network can also be turned off to 
compare results with a data structure that cannot detect 
trends, and thus invents ideas merely at random. If the 
fitness of an action is evaluated to be higher than that of 
any action learned thus far, it is copied from the 
input/output nodes of the neural network that represent 
concepts of body parts to a six digit array that contains 
representations of actual body parts, referred to as the body. 
Since it is useful to know how many agents are doing 
essentially the same thing, when node activations are 
translated into limb movement they are threshold such that 
there are only three possibilities for each limb: stationary, 
up, or down. Six limbs with three possible positions each 
gives a total of 729 possible actions. Only the action that is 
currently implemented by an agent’s body can be observed 
and imitated by other agents. 
THE ARTIFICIAL WORLD 
MAV allowed only worlds that were square and toroidal, or 
‘wrap-around’ (such that agents at the left border that 
attempt to move further left appear on the right border). In 
EVOC the world can assume any shape, and be as sparsely 
or densely populated as required, with agents placed in any 
configuration. EVOC also allows for the creation of 
complete or semi-permeable permanent or eroding borders 
that decrease the probability of imitation along a frontier 
(although this was not used in the experiments reported 
here). 
INCORPORATION OF COGNITIVEPHENOMENA 
The neural network can be turned off to compare neural 
network results with those obtained using a database that 
cannot learn trends, and thus invents ideas at random. The 
following cultural evolution parameters can also be turned 
off or on (in some cases to varying degrees). 
Imitation 
Fit actions diffuse through the society when agents copy 
neighbors’ actions. During imitation, the input is the action 
implemented by a neighbor. The process of finding a 
neighbor to imitate works through a form of lazy (non-
greedy) search. An imitating agent randomly scans its 
neighbors, and adopts the first action that is fitter than the 
action it is currently implementing. If it does not find a 
neighbor that is executing a fitter action than its own 
current action, it continues to execute the current action. 
Invention 
Agents generate new actions by modifying their initial 
action or an action that has been invented previously or 
acquired through imitation. During invention, the pattern of 
activation on the output nodes is fed back to the input 
nodes, and invention is biased according to the activations 
of the SYMMETRY, MOVEMENT, and OPPOSITE 
hidden nodes. (Were this not the case there would be no 
benefit to using a neural network.) The extent to which the 
generation of novelty is biased by past experience is 
referred to as the learning rate. To invent a new idea, for 
each node of the idea currently represented on the input 
layer of the neural network, the agent makes a probabilistic 
decision as to whether the position of that body part will 
change, and if it does, the direction of change is 
stochastically biased according to the learning rate. If the 
new idea has a higher fitness than the currently 
implemented idea, the agent learns and implements the 
action specified by that idea. (See Gabora, 1995 for further 
details.)  
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Learning 
Invention makes use of the ability to detect, learn, and 
respond adaptively to trends. Since a new action (or, in 
invention, a new idea for an action) is not learned unless it 
is fitter than the currently implemented action, new actions 
provide valuable information about what constitutes an 
effective idea. Thus knowledge acquired through the 
evaluation of previous actions is translated into educated 
guesses about what constitutes a successful action, and this 
is accomplished by updating the learning rate.  
There are two learnable trends. The first concerns the 
overall level of activity involved in successful actions. 
Learning this trend can bias the generation of new ideas in 
favor of either more movement or less. Each body part 
starts out at a stationary rest position, and with an equal 
probability of changing to movement in one direction or the 
other. If the fitter action codes for more movement, 
increase the probability of movement of each body part. Do 
the opposite if the fitter action codes for less movement. If 
movement is generally beneficial, increase the probability 
that new actions involve movement of more body parts. 
This trend is based on the assumption that movement in 
general (regardless of which particular body part is 
moving) can be beneficial or detrimental. This seems like a 
useful generalization since movement of any body part uses 
energy and increases the likelihood of being detected. It is 
implemented as follows: 
am1 = movement node activation for current action  
am2 = movement node activation for new action 
p(im)I = probability of increased movement at body part i  
p(dm)I = probability of decreased movement at body part i 
 
IF (am2>am1)   
THEN p(im)I = MAX(1.0, p(im)I + 0.1)   
ELSE IF (am2<am1)   
THEN p(im)I = MIN(0.0, p(im)I - 0.1) 
p(dm)I = 1 - p(im)i 
The second learnable trend is: if successful actions tend to 
be symmetrical (e.g. left arm moves to the right and right 
arm moves to the left), the probability increases that new 
actions are symmetrical. (See Gabora 1995 for details.) 
This generalization is biologically sensible, since many 
useful actions (e.g. walking) entail movement of limbs in 
opposite directions, while others (e.g. pushing) entail 
movement of limbs in the same direction. However, the 
reason for implementing a preference for symmetrical limb 
coordination is not to produce a biologically realistic model 
of motor control but to provide a systematic rationale for 
associating different actions with a graded distribution of 
fitness values.  
The preference for symmetrical limb coordination is 
implemented in a manner analogous to that of the first rule. 
Of particular relevance to the current investigation, if 
multi-step actions involving one limb moving sequentially 
one direction and then the other are beneficial, the 
probability of inventing such actions increases. 
In summary, each action is associated with a measure of its 
effectiveness, and generalizations about what seems to 
work and what does not are translated into guidelines for 
what action to take. 
Evaluation 
Before committing to implementing an idea as an action, 
agents can assess how successful the action would be if it 
were implemented. They evaluate the effectiveness of their 
actions according to how well they satisfy needs using a 
pre-defined equation that rewards actions that make use of 
trends detected by the SYMMETRY, MOVEMENT, and 
OPPOSITE hidden nodes. A successful action is one in 
which all body parts except the head are moving, and limb 
movement is asymmetrical. (Thus if the left arm is moving 
up, the right arm is moving down, and vice versa.) For the 
experiments reported here with chaining turned off, where 
total body movement, m, is calculated by adding the 
number of active body parts, and mh is head movement, the 
fitness, Fnc, is calculated as follows: 
sa = 1 if arms are moving symmetrically; 0 otherwise 
sl = 1 if legs are moving symmetrically; 0 otherwise 
mh = 1 if head is stationary; 0 otherwise 
Fnc = m+ 1.5(sa+ sl) + 2(1 – mh) 
This gives a fitness function with a maximum value of ten, 
because while movement of the head contributes positively 
to the first term (which represents overall movement) it 
contributes negatively to the third term (which represents 
head stability). This corresponds to a relatively realistic 
action with respect to the need to attract the attention of, 
and maintain eye contact with others including a potential 
mate. 
Since there are two optimal movements for the hips, one 
optimal movement for the head (or in this case, a lack of 
movement), two optimal arm combinations, and two 
optimal leg combinations, there are eight different optimal 
actions. In previous versions of the program that did not 
allow for chained actions, once an agent converged on one 
of the eight optimal actions (out of the possible 729 
actions), it implemented that action for the rest of the run. 
Therefore, once all agents had found one or another of the 
optimal actions, the mean fitness of actions across the 
society plateaus, and the set of implemented actions 
became fixed. 
Chaining 
Chaining, which is new to this version of the program, 
gives agents the opportunity to execute multi-step actions. 
For the experiments reported here with chaining turned on, 
if in the first step of an action an agent was moving at least 
one of its arms, it executes a second step, which again 
involves up to six body parts. If, in the first step, the agent 
moved one arm in one direction, and in the second step it 
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moved the same arm in the opposite direction, it has the 
opportunity to execute a three-step action. And so on. The 
agent is allowed to execute an arbitrarily long action so 
long as it continues to move the same arm in the opposite 
direction to the direction it moved previously. Once it does 
not do so, the chained action comes to an end. The longer it 
moves, the higher the fitness of this multi-step chained 
action. Where n is the number of chained actions, the 
fitness, Fc, is calculated as follows: 
 
Fc = Fnc+ (n – 1) 
 
The fitness function with chaining provides a simple means 
of simulating the capacity for recursive recall. 
We omit a detailed explanation of EVOC options that were 
not used in the experiments reported here, such as 
broadcasting, which allows the action of a leader to be 
visible to not just immediate neighbors, but all agents, 
thereby simulating the effects of media (Gabora, 2008a,b; 
Leijnen & Gabora, 2010). 
A TYPICAL RUN 
Each iteration, every agent has the opportunity to (1) 
acquire an idea for a new action, either by imitation, 
copying a neighbor, or by invention, creating one anew, (2) 
update the knowledge-based operators, and (3) implement a 
new action. To invent a new idea, for each node of the idea 
currently represented on the input/output layer of the neural 
network, the agent makes a probabilistic decision as to 
whether change will take place, and if it does, the direction 
of change is stochastically biased by the knowledge-based 
operators. If the new idea has a higher fitness than the 
currently implemented idea, the agent learns and 
implements the action specified by that idea. To acquire an 
idea through imitation, an agent randomly chooses one of 
its neighbors, and evaluates the fitness of the action the 
neighbor is implementing. If its own action is fitter than 
that of the neighbor, it chooses another neighbor, until it 
has either observed all of its immediate neighbors, or found 
one with a fitter action. If no fitter action is found, the agent 
does nothing. Otherwise, the neighbor’s action is copied to 
the input layer, learned, and implemented. 
Fitness of actions starts out low because initially all agents 
are immobile. Soon some agent invents an action that has a 
higher fitness than doing nothing, and this action gets 
imitated, so fitness increases. Fitness increases further as 
other ideas get invented, assessed, implemented as actions, 
and spread through imitation. The diversity of actions 
initially increases due to the proliferation of new ideas, and 
then decreases as agents hone in on the fittest actions. 
THE GRAPHIC USER INTERFACE 
The graphic user interface (GUI) makes use of the open 
source charting project, JFreeChart, enabling variables to 
be user defined at run time, and results to become visible as 
the program runs. The topmost output panel, shown in 
Figure 2, is provided to give the reader a sense of how the 
program works. 
EXPERIMENTS 
In previous versions of EVOC, that did not allow chaining, 
there were only a fixed number of possible actions, and 
once all agents converged on optimal actions, cultural 
change ground to a halt. We hypothesized that if agents 
were able to chain actions together to form arbitrarily long 
actions, fitness would not stop increasing, and the agents 
would not converge on the same fixed set of actions. 
For these experiments the artificial world was a toroidal 
lattice with 100 nodes, each occupied by a single, 
stationary agent. We used a von Neumann neighborhood 
structure, (agents only interacted with their four adjacent 
neighbors). 
All graphs plot averages of ten runs, with an invention to 
imitation ratio of 1:1, and a rate of conceptual change of 
1/6. (Since there are six body parts this means 
approximately one body part movement per step of an 
action). All agents were stationary at the start of a run. 
 
 
Figure 2. Output panel of GUI. At the upper left one specifies 
the Invention to Imitation Ratio. This is the probability that a 
given agent, on a given iteration, invents a new idea for an 
action, versus the probability that it imitates a neighbor’s 
action. Below it is Rate of Conceptual Change, where one 
specifies the degree to which a newly invented idea differs 
from the one it was based on. Below that is Number of Agents, 
which allows the user to specify the size of the artificial 
society. Below that is where one specifies Number of 
Iterations, i.e. the duration of a run. Agents can be accessed 
individually by clicking the appropriate cell in the grid on the 
upper right. This enables one to see such details as the action 
currently implemented by that agent, or the fitness of that 
action. The graphs at the bottom plot the mean idea fitness 
and diversity of ideas. Tabs shown at the top give access to 
other output panels. 
 
Effect of Chaining on Fitness of Actions 
Figure 3 shows the results of comparing how the capacity 
to recursively chain actions together affects the mean 
fitness of actions across the artificial society over the 
duration of a run.  
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Figure 3. Mean fitness of actions in the artificial society with 
chaining versus without chaining.  
 
The capacity to chain together simple actions to form more 
complex ones increases the mean fitness of actions across 
the artificial society. This is most evident in the later phase 
of a run. Without chaining, agents converge on optimal 
actions, and the mean fitness of action reaches a plateau. 
With chaining, however, there is no ceiling on the mean 
fitness of actions. By the 100th iteration it reached almost 
15, indicating a high incidence of chaining. 
Effect of Chaining on Diversity of Actions 
Figure 3 shows the results of comparing how the capacity 
to recursively chain actions together affects the mean 
fitness of actions across the artificial society over the 
duration of a run. 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean number of different actions in the artificial 
society with chaining (continuous line) versus without 
chaining (dashed line). 
 
Chaining also increases the diversity of actions. This is 
most evident in the early phase of a run before agents begin 
to converge on optimal actions, though it remains the case 
throughout the duration of a run. Interestingly, although in 
both cases there is convergence on optimal actions, without 
chained actions, this is a static set (thus mean fitness 
plateaus) whereas with chained actions the set of optimal 
actions is always changing, as increasingly fit actions are 
found (thus mean fitness keeps increasing). 
The Effect of Chaining on Learning  
Recall that agents have the capacity to learn trends from 
past experiences (using the knowledge-based operators), 
and thereby bias the generation of novelty in directions that 
have a greater than chance probability of being fruitful. 
Results obtained previously with this kind of computer 
model of cultural evolution showed that learning increases 
the mean fitness of actions throughout the duration of a run 
(Gabora, 1995). Since chaining provides more 
opportunities to capitalize on the capacity to learn, we 
hypothesized that chaining would accentuate the impact of 
learning on the mean fitness of actions across the artificial 
society. Figure 5 compares the effect of chaining with 
knowledge-based operators turned on (agents are able to 
learn) versus when they are turned off (agents are unable to 
learn).  
 
Figure 5. Mean fitness of actions in the artificial society with 
both chained actions and learning (top), with just chained 
actions (second from the top) with just learning (second from 
the bottom), and with neither chained actions nor learning 
(bottom). 
 
This hypothesis was confirmed. Since waving an arm back 
and forth increased activation of the OPPOSITE hidden 
node, agents learned to generate increasingly longer moves 
throughout the duration of a run. When agents are given the 
capacity to chain together simple actions to form more 
complex ones, the increase in mean fitness of actions 
throughout the duration of a run is more pronounced, 
indicating that the society as a whole benefits much more 
from learning. 
Discussion 
Many species possess what could be called culture, but 
human culture is unique in that ideas build on each other 
cumulatively; indeed culture is widely thought to be an 
evolutionary process (e.g. Bentley, Ormerod, & Batty, 
2011; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Gabora, 1996, 
2008; Hartley, 2009;Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2004, 
2006; Whiten, Hinde, Laland, & Stringer, 2011). Using an 
agent based computer model of cultural evolution, we 
obtained support for the hypothesis that the onset of 
cumulative, open-ended cultural evolution can be attributed 
to the evolution of a self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop, 
enabling the recursive chaining of thoughts and actions. 
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Our results suggest that it is the capacity for recursive recall 
that makes possible the open-endedness of some 
computational models of language evolution (e.g. Kirby, 
2001). Note that in the chaining versus no chaining 
conditions the size of the neural network is the same, but 
how it is used differs. This suggests that it was not larger 
brain size per se that initiated the onset of cumulative 
culture, but that larger brain size enabled episodes to be 
encoded in more detail, allowing more routes for reminding 
and recall, thereby facilitating the ability to recursively re-
describe information stored in memory (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992), thereby tailor it to the situation at hand. 
By demonstrating that onset of the capacity for recursive 
recall constitutes a viable explanation for how cultural 
change became cumulative and open-ended, we believe that 
this research is a pivotal step forward in the development of 
a scientific theory of cultural evolution. Nevertheless, the 
model is simplified, and caution must be taken applying 
such results to the real world. The agents can be said to 
have the goal of optimizing the fitness of their actions, but 
they do not have values, norms, or social bonds remotely 
like ours. The goal behind a computational model such as 
EVOC, however, is to extract the skeleton of a process as 
complex as cultural evolution and investigate questions that 
are difficult to investigate by other means. To our 
knowledge, this is the only experimental test of, and 
tentative support for, the hypothesis that the capacity for 
self-triggered recall of thoughts and recursive execution of 
actions played a key role in ratcheting the kind of 
cumulative, open-ended novelty and cultural complexity 
that surrounds us. Despite that evolved cultural complexity 
essentially defines our humanness, we know of no other 
computational modeling support for this or any other 
competing hypothesis concerning how the transition from 
episodic to mimetic cognition came about.  
Future work will focus on simulating more complex forms 
of recursive recall that would require a larger neural 
network, and corroborating findings obtained with the 
model with archaeological and anthropological evidence. 
Another direction of future research involves using EVOC 
to investigate competing hypotheses concerning what 
cognitive mechanism could have given rise to the explosive 
cultural transition in the Middle-Upper Paleolithic (Klein, 
1999; Leaky, 1984). 
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